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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
COLEMAN V. SOCCER ASS'N OF COLUMBIA: THE
DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WILL
REMAIN
THE
STANDARD
IN
MARYLAND
FOR
NEGLIGENCE CASES UNLESS THE LEGISLATURE TAKES
ACTION OTHERWISE.
By: Katelyn Vu
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reafftrmed the doctrine of contributory
negligence. Coleman v. Soccer Ass 'n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 685, 69
A.3d 1149, 1152 (2013). The court added that although it has the power to
judicially abrogate the common law, it is reluctant to make changes that are
contrary to the state's public policy set forth by the Maryland General
.<
Assembly. Coleman, 432 Md. at 691, 69 A.3d at 1156.
On August 19,2008, James Coleman ("Coleman") suffered injuries while
coaching youth practice for the Soccer Association of Columbia ("SAC"), in
Howard County, Maryland. During the practice, Coleman went to retrieve a
ball from one of the soccer goals and jumped up to hang from the goal's
crossbar. The goal was unanchored to the ground and fell on top of him. As
a result, Coleman suffered several facial injuries which resulted in three
metal plates being inserted into his face.
Coleman sued SAC for negligence in the Circuit Court for Howard
County. Coleman proffered a jury instruction on comparative negligence,
but the judge refused his request and instructed the jury on contributory
negligence. The jury found that SAC was negligent, and that SAC's
negligence caused Coleman's injuries. However, the jury further found that
Coleman was negligent as well, and that his negligence also contributed to
his injuries. Applying the doctrine of contributory negligence, the court
barred Coleman from any recovery, entering judgment in favor of SAC.
Before briefing and oral argument in the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider
whether the doctrine of contributory negligence should be upheld.
The court began its analysis by examining the common law doctrine of
contributory negligence. Coleman, 432 Md. at 685,69 A.3d at 1152. Under
the doctrine of contributory negligence, a plaintiff who contributes to his or
her injury by his or her own negligence is barred from all recovery. Id.
(citing Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill. 200, 205 (1847)). The standard of
contributory negligence was initially adopted at a time when courts were
concerned about plaintiff-minded juries awarding sums large enough to
suppress newly developing industries. Coleman, 432 Md. at 686, 69 A.3d at
1153 (citing Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Ed. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 450,
456 A.2d 894, 898 (1983)). The standard of contributory negligence was
also adopted to prevent courts from assisting a wrongdoer in recovering
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damages for injuries to which the wrongdoer had contributed. Coleman, 432
Md. at 686-87, 69 A.3d at 1153 (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 450,456 A.2d
at 898). The court then affirmed that the contributory negligence standard
was the valid standard governing negligence cases in Maryland, and that any
change in the standard was for the legislature to decide. Coleman, 432 Md.
at 686,69 A.3d at 1152 (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905).
The court noted that the declaration of Maryland's public policy is
generally a function of the Maryland General Assembly. Coleman, 432 Md.
at 689,69 A.3d at 1155 (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 459,456 A.2d at 903).
More importantly, the court indicated that it was particularly reluctant to
change a common law rule that is contrary to the state's public policy set
forth by the legislature. Coleman, 432 Md. at 690, 69 A.3d at 1155 (citing
Harrison, 295 Md. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903). The abrogation of contributory
negligence additionally requires the substitution of an alternative standard.
Coleman, 432 Md. at 688, 69 A.3d at 1154 (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 45455, 456 A.2d at 900-01). The court stated that the decision of which
alternative standard to adopt was a matter of public policy, and therefore was
a decision for the legislature. Coleman, 432 Md. at 688, 69 A.3d at 1154
(citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 454-55,456 A.2d at 900-01).
The court proceeded to review the trend in other jurisdictions that adopted
comparative negligence as a replacement for contributory negligence.
Coleman, 432 Md. at 688-89, 69 A.3d at 1154 (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at
453, 456 A.2d at 899). As of 1983, the last time the court addressed the
issue of comparative negligence, thirty-nine states had adopted the
comparative negligence standard. Coleman, 432 Md. at 688, 69 A.3d at
1154 (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 453, 456 A.2d at 899). The court pointed
out that of those states, thirty-one had adopted the doctrine by statue.
Coleman, 432 Md. at 688, 69 AJd at 1154 (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 453,
456 A.2d at 899).
The court then considered the significance of the General Assembly's
repeated failure to enact bills seeking to change the contributory negligence
standard. Coleman, 432 Md. at 693, 69 A.3d at 1157. From 1966 to 1982,
twenty-one bills were proposed to the Maryland legislature, none of which
were enacted. Id. (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904). The
court emphasized that the legislature's repeated failure to enact bills seeking
to change the common law doctrine of contributory negligence is a
significant indication of the State's current public policy. Coleman, 432 Md.
at 693, 69 A.3d at 1157.
The dissent argued that the court was not so bound by the doctrine of
stare decisis such that it would inhibit the court from judicially abrogating a
common law rule that was unsound in modem circumstances. Coleman, 432
Md. at 704, 69 A.3d at 1163 (Harrell, J., dissenting). The dissent further
stated that because the court created the doctrine of contributory negligence,
the court had the duty and responsibility to change it. Id. at 702, 69 A.3d at
1162 (Harrell, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent advocated for the
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prospective application of a pure comparative fault system. Id. at 725, 69
A.3d at 1177 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the dissent's concerns by
determining whether the court has the power to abolish the contributory
negligence standard. Coleman, 432 Md. at 691,69 A.3d at 1156. The court
acknowledged that the common law is subject to judicial modification in
light of modem circumstances or increased knowledge. Id. (citing Ireland v.
State, 310 Md. 328, 331-32, 529 A.2d 365, 366 (1987». The court further
acknowledged that an equally established principle is that the common law
should not be changed by judicial action, contrary to the State's public policy
set forth by the legislature. Coleman, 432 Md. at 691, 69 A.3d at 1156
(citing Ireland, 310 Md. at 331-32,529 A.2d at 366).
The concurrence agreed with the majority that the decision to abrogate
contributory negligence should be deferred to the General Assembly, but
admitted that a system of comparative negligence would be more equitable
for determining liability cases in Maryland. Coleman, 432 Md. at 738, 69
A.3d at 1184 (Greene J., concurring).
In Coleman, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the valid
standard in Maryland governing negligence cases was the doctrine of
contributory negligence. The court refused to follow the trend from fortyfive other states which abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence to
instead adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence as the standard
governing negligence cases. Although the court acknowledged that judicial
abrogation is well within its power, the court emphasized the importance of
the Maryland General Assembly in making these types of public policy
decisions. This holding makes it clear that the court will refuse to take sides
when faced with a public policy debate, and will continue to defer the issue
to the legislature.

